November 2, 2007: for immediate release
U.S. Freedom Foundation
For consideration as editorial or news source material on America's
reserve to the National Guard, State Defense Forces:
Plain text format

America Still Unprepared for Catastrophic Disaster:
State Defense Force Manpower Remedy Ignored by National Leaders
COL John R. Brinkerhoff (RET), USA, Senior Fellow for Homeland
Security, U.S. Freedom Foundation
An Address to the State Guard Association of the United States
National Conference, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 19, 2007

Five years ago I addressed the State Guard Association Annual
Conference in Charleston.   At that time I spoke to the urgent need
for tens of thousands of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed
militia members to augment the National Guards of their respective
states. I said that there would be emergencies that would require
large numbers of armed personnel to provide for crowd control,
evacuation, and maintenance of law and order. I urged the White House,
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Governors
of the several states to take advantage of the low cost state defense
forces to provide additional troops when needed. I charged the State
Guard Association with the mission of reviving the State Defense
Forces for Homeland Security. I assigned myself the same mission.

I have the unpleasant duty to tell you that I have failed, you have
failed, we all have failed to accomplish the mission. In 2002, there
were 11,000 active SDF personnel in 16 states and Puerto Rico.   In
2007, there are 20,000 active SDF personnel in 24 states and Puerto
Rico. This is some progress, but it is not enough.

There are still 26 states without state defense forces. Many of the
existing state defense forces still consist mostly of senior officers
and senior NCOs. Most states do not permit their state defense force
members to bear arms. Some states keep their SDF units in cadre
status. Not a single state has a state defense force that can provide
an adequate number of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed
troops to deal with a nuclear attack, an influenza pandemic, another
Category five hurricane, a catastrophic earthquake in Missouri, or
any other catastrophic emergency.

We tried. Many of you stepped up to the task and tried to gain
support. Hall Worthington, Jack McNiff, Ron Markarian, Al Zapanta,
John Stone, and many others of you spent valuable time in visiting
the folks at the National Guard Bureau, the DOD, DHS, and the
Congress. A lot of time and effort was expended.
We failed. We were unable to persuade the Federal government to take
this program seriously. Despite excellent support from numerous
members of Congress, we were unable to persuade Congress to enact the
Home Defense Forces Improvement bill. We were unable to persuade many
of the governors and their adjutants general to support the SDF. It
is a sad fact that after five years of effort, most senior people in
the Federal Government still have not even heard about the state
defense forces.

Who opposed the SDF? As the Lord High Executioner said in The Mikado,
I have a little list.

Strangely, the most fervent opposition to a robust SDF came from four
groups that have most to gain from a robust SDF: The National Guard
Bureau, Department of Defense, National Guard Association of the US,
and the Adjutant Generals Association.

The most disappointing organization has been the National Guard
Bureau. Although the Chief, of the NGB still has responsibility for
oversight of the SDT, nothing has been done so create an effective
SDF program. We visited the NGB several times but to no avail. There
was no interest in NGB to have a strong SDF. That meant that there
has been no advocate for SDF inside DOD.   Lack of NGB support has
blocked progress and made it hard to to obtain arms, equipment, and
training support from DOD.   In other respects, the National Guard
has done a magnificent job in supporting overseas operations and
providing for homeland security. The impromptu marshaling of NG units
from other states to provide a timely military presence for the
Katrina response was brilliant. The role, resources, and respect for
the National Guard has grown. But The National Guard Bureau has
failed us and the Nation by not finding time and energy to support a
strong SDF.

Another big disappointment has been the Office of the Secretary of
Defense—OSD. I visited a group of deputy assistant secretaries in the
Reserve Affairs Office and presented the case for the SDF.   Since I
knew these people, had worked with then before, and was during my own
career the acting deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, I assumed that they would agree with me that the need was
important and that reviving to SDF to provide augmentation for the
National Guard would be an easy sell. Instead, I was rebuffed rudely
and my proposal was ridiculed. I can tell you I was not only
disappointed but humiliated. These people laughed at the idea of
allowing people like you to bear arms in defense of your home states.
They have chosen instead to advocate a volunteer civilian reserve
program that would stockpile specialists that could augment the
military forces when needed. These civilians would, of course, be
unarmed. That went nowhere, but so did DOD support for the SDF.

I also tried to get the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense to become our champion. The staff officers there
were unwilling even to raise this issue with the Assistant Secretary
because they told me that he had a bad experience with a senior
officer of the New York Naval Militia officer right after the 911
attacks and was dead set against the SDF.  

The National Guard Association did not help us. I went to the leaders
of this organization and begged for their support.   They turned me
down and treated me to a recitation of the customary anecdotes about
renegade militias and too many generals and colonels. I did hope that
the NGAUS could see the merit in the SDF, but they did not then and
do not to this day.

The greatest obstacle to the development of a strong SDF has been the
Adjutant General Association composed of all 54 adjutants general.
Even though half of the TAGs have SDF units under their command, the
association has opposed the expansion of the SDF.   This is a case of
unwarranted solidarity that does damage to the SDF program.

Only one organization in DOD provided significant support for the SDF.
The Reserve Forces Policy Board under the leadership of Al Zapanta
worked hard on our behalf.   Al was a magnificent leader and along
with Bob Fiedler and others on his staff, was untiring in his support
for the SDF.   The RFPB sponsored a major event in Washington DC that
ought to have sparked some interest and, but the RFBB could not
prevail over the anti-SDF attitudes of officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.  

We also tried to elicit support from several of the Washington think
tanks and military organizations. This effort was not successful.   
Most of the organizations had no idea of what we were talking about.
Each had an agenda to promote and was unwilling to take on another
issue. One major think tank agreed with the need for more armed
troops, but wanted a federal force under DHS control instead of state
troops under control of the Governors.   Many simply were unwilling
to credit the thought that you SDF people could be trusted to bear
arms in defense of your localities.

We did try to obtain support from the Department of Homeland Security.
Hall, Jack, and I visited a senior official at DHS headquarters, met
with him, and never heard from him again. I recently raised the issue
with senior people in FEMA and also in DHS headquarters, to no avail.


At this point it is probably a good idea to say to the
representatives of the organizations that I have cited for failing to
support a robust SDF program that there is nothing personal about my
remarks.   As Tony Soprano might say, it is just business. Actually,
I speak more in sorrow than in anger.   It is just that it is hard to
understand why any sensible person can oppose this legal and
inexpensive expansion of the Nation’s military forces in a time of
grave danger.

Well, what is that danger?

There is a significant probability of another catastrophic emergency
in the near future, whether it is a terrorist attack or a natural
disaster. I have spent a great amount of my time in the past five
years analyzing these catastrophic emergencies. A catastrophic
incident or emergency is defined in the National Response Plan as
follows:

Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption
severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,
economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic
event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged
period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally
available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in
the impact area; and significantly interrupts government operations
and emergency services to such an extent that national security would
be threatened.

The Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP says further that a
catastrophic emergency will require immediate and proactive action by
the Federal Government.

I am going to discuss five potential catastrophic emergencies in
brief. The scenarios I will mention are a nuclear attack, an
influenza pandemic, the New Madrid Earthquake, a prolonged power
outage in a metropolitan area, and prolonged disruption of electronic
communications.  

A Nuclear Detonation
The most serious threat is a nuclear attack on a major metropolitan
area. This is Scenario Number one of the fifteen standard national
planning scenarios issued by the Homeland Security Council to provide
a common basis for national planning and preparedness.  

In 2005, Bob Bovey, Gene Porter, and I wrote an Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA) study for the Office of the Secretary of Defense that
proposed a concept of operations and estimated the demand for trained,
organized, and disciplined personnel to conduct a response operation
designed to maximize the number of healthy survivors.   This study
has been used as the basis for an OSD War Game and, suitably modified
and improved, for DOD planning for this catastrophic emergency.   The
major problem with a nuclear detonation is the ionizing gamma
radiation from fallout particles.  

The concept of operations for managing the consequences of a nuclear
detonation calls for organizing the space around the point of
detonation into three zones.
The Primary Zone will encompass the direct blast and thermal effects
of the detonation and also the primary alpha, gamma, and beta
radiation.   During the response, this Primary Zone will be defined
and sealed off with a cordon to prevent egress by untrained and
unequipped persons and to receive and process survivors who can leave
the primary zone. There will be no attempts to enter the primary zone
to rescue survivors.   The Primary Zone will contain the bulk of the
structural damage and the immediate fires from the thermal effects,
although there may be secondary fires outside the Primary Zone.   For
a 10kt weapon, the Primary Zone will have a radius of about two miles.
Depending on population density for a city and the time of detonation,
about 200,000 people will be killed inside the Primary Zone. In
effect, the idea is to lay siege to the Primary Zone and move the
perimeter inward as the radiation decays.

The Fallout Zone will encompass the area affected by gamma radiation
emanating from fallout particles borne aloft. The explosion will
cause small particles to be borne by winds aloft downwind and
deposited there. The radiation intensity is greatest near the point
of detonation and decreases thereafter. There is no physical damage
in the Fallout Zone. Again depending on population density, there
could be about one million people or more who have to take shelter or
evacuate the Fallout Zone.   The major thrust of the entire response
operation is to help these million people avoid a dangerous doze of
ionizing radiation. That means that we have to be able to measure the
intensity of radiation, predict the path of the fallout plume, and
establish cordons around the Fallout Zone to prevent people from
moving into the radiation and provide a means of processing,
decontaminating, and treating people who evacuate the Fallout Zone.  
We advocate a mixed survival strategy for people in the Fallout Zone
that includes both sheltering and evacuation in an orderly manner.
This requires that we be able to communicate with the people and
conduct a phased evacuation. For a 10kt weapon, the length of the
Fallout Zone could be as great as 200 miles. The idea is to get as
many people as possible out of the zone before they receive a
dangerous dose of ionizing radiation.

There is also a Secondary Zone that will serve as a base area to
support the response operation and to shelter the people who are
evacuated from the Fallout Zone. This area will also be cordoned off
to limit the movement of evacuees, who might be suffering from
radiation illness from leaving the Secondary Zone and to prevent
entry into the Secondary Zone of unauthorized persons who will
increase workload in that zone and complicate the working of the
response operation.   The secondary zone population could be as much
as six million people, who would have to be able to accommodate the
one million refugees. The idea is to limit the effects of the
explosion so that the rest of the Nation will not be impacted.

The parts of the United States outside the Secondary Zone will be in
a state of increased alert and even panic. Authorities will
anticipate a second attack and citizens will be afraid. This means
that horizontal reinforcement programs such as the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) that draws forces from other
states will not work.

Using some rough rules of thumb, we estimated the number of trained,
organized, and disciplined responders that would be needed to conduct
an effective response operation. We estimated that it would take
about 300,000 such personnel, of which 150,000 would have to be armed
to do their jobs.   Armed personnel are needed to form and enforce
the cordons around the Primary Zone, Fallout Zone, and Secondary Zone,
to manage the evacuation, secure response personnel processing
evacuees, protect shelters and camps for evacuees, and maintain law
and order within the Secondary Zone. This demand can be met only by
law enforcement officers, active duty and reserve military troops,
National Guard troops, and armed members of State Defense Forces.
In the response to a Nuclear Detonation, the first few hours are of
critical importance. The response operation will essentially be over
after the first 48 hours.   All who can be saved will have been saved
by that time. The rest will die of injuries or exposure to
radiation—sooner or later. This reality places a premium on rapid
response. The first actions will be taken by the local responders.
The initial reinforcements will be state resources, including nearby
National Guard elements and SDF units.  Federal resources will arrive
on the scene as rapidly as they can. They will not wait until asked
but as soon as the nuclear weapon detonates will proceed instantly
and automatically in accordance with the Catastrophic Incident
Supplement to the National Response Plan.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and NORTHCOM have refined
these numbers and have studied how to meet the demands of the nuclear
scenario. They have established a concept of operations and prepared
a list of units to respond. Their studies have, not surprisingly,
revealed a gap between demand and supply in the first 48 hours.  
Simply put there are not going to be enough armed troops available
rapidly to provide an adequate response when it is most needed.

Filling that gap in armed responders is the duty of the State Defense
Forces.   Local militia units organized, equipped, trained, and armed
can provide what is essential for the first hours after a nuclear
detonation. Acting on pre-scripted assignments, these units can help
the local and state police set up the cordons, patrol the evacuation
routes, respond to civil unrest, and secure key facilities. It might
be possible also to enable the local SDF units to help in measuring
radiation intensity and delivering emergency public information.  
This is the most demanding emergency the National faces.    

I am also involved in studying measures to interdict nuclear weapons
before they can get into the United States.   Let me tell you that it
would be foolish to assume that dedicated terrorists would not try to
do this. It would be doubly foolish to assume they cannot succeed. If
they do detonate a nuclear weapon in the United States, and we have
not prepared to minimize the effect of the explosion, we will have
failed the Nation. 

I want to explore for a minute why we do not prepare for this
emergency or for other catastrophic emergencies. It is a matter of
attitude. Many people would rather deal with the known and familiar
hazards and are reluctant to address the big ones. It was obvious for
years that a Category Four Hurricane would strike New Orleans and
that the levees were weak, but only a few hard core members of the
Emergency Management Community took that possibility seriously.

I want to share with you’re a story that illustrates the difficulty
of getting people to support an armed SDF.  

In November 2005 I went to Columbus, Ohio at the request of Michael
Moran, a member of the Ohio Military Reserve Association, to support
the efforts of Moran and others to improve the Ohio Military Reserve.
The occasion was a hearing of the Ohio Military Reserve and Homeland
Security Study Commission. The objective of this exercise was to
persuade the Ohio General Assembly to provide for modernizing the
authorizing legislation for the Ohio Military Reserve and provide
funding for expansion of the strength of that organization. My role
was to testify before the Commission and advise them of the need for
Ohio to have a strong SDF.    The Commission included the Director of
Homeland Security, the Adjutant General, Director of Public Safety,
two Senators, and three Representatives.

I told the Commission that a strong, organized, disciplined, trained,
and armed Ohio Military Reserve was essential in an age of terrorism.
I spoke about the effects of a 10kt nuclear detonation in Chicago.
This was another scenario that IDA had also addressed in its work. I
explained that the Fallout Zone for such an attack would extend
eastward from Chicago across Northern Indiana and Ohio to Toledo,
Ohio. Thousands of Hoosiers and Ohioans would be fleeing southward to
escape the radiation threat.   I had done my homework and pointed out
that the combined resources available to the Governor of Ohio in the
form of state police and National Guard would be inadequate to manage
that situation. I said the Ohio needed a strong, armed SDF of tens of
thousands of armed troops to deal with that kind of emergency. I also
noted that such a volunteer force would be of great value to Ohio for
lesser emergencies.

The efforts Mike Moran and his colleagues were to no avail. The
leadership of Ohio would not support a strong SDF. All that Moran
wanted was to achieve legitimacy and have a cadre force of about 1,
500 unarmed members and a miniscule budget. I had suggested an armed
force of about 30,000.   None of this was achieved. The Commission
decided not to do anything for the Ohio Military Reserve. The
greatest opponent of the enhanced SDF for Ohio was the Adjutant
General, who said that he could do it all with the National Guard and
did not need any help.   I was distressed by this view. Upon
reflection, I concluded that in addition to turf and money problems,
the Adjutant General and most of the others did not believe there
would ever be a nuclear attack in Chicago.

The problem is with attitude. Complacency is not a virtue for those
charged with defending the United States. To be truly effective,
responders have to believe that emergencies will truly occur.  

Influenza Pandemic
An Influenza Pandemic with the Avian Flu H5N1 virus could be more
devastating than even a nuclear detonation.   We know the Avian Flu
virus has infected a lot of birds and that it has al\ready been
transmitted from birds to other animals and in a few cases from birds
and animals to humans. When that happens, it is possible for the
Avian Flu to affect the entire country very quickly. The pandemic
will spread in two waves. The first wave will last about three months
and attack mostly healthy young adults. There will be an inter-
pandemic period of about three months, and then the second wave will
start and last about two months and attack mostly older adults. As it
spreads, the virus will mutate and shift to new forms that cannot be
predicted in advance but can be determined only by isolating and
identifying each new strain. Depending on the number of patients that
become infected, the effects will range from 90,000 to 210,000 dead,
300,000 to 700,000 hospitalizations, 18 million to 40 million
outpatients, and total infections of from 38 million to 93 million
people. Whether the workload is the upper limit or the lower limit or
something in between depends on how the response is conducted.

The public health and health care delivery system cannot deal
effectively with this kind of pandemic. Vaccinations will not stop
the spread of the disease because the correct vaccine cannot be made
until the exact virus is identified. Once the causal virus is
isolated, it will take six to nine months to produce the appropriate
vaccine. Even if an H5N1 vaccine is stockpiled in advance, it might
not be effective. Even if it is effective, it will be impossible to
vaccinate more than about 10% of the population.

The public health and health care delivery systems will be
overwhelmed. The number of physicians, nurses, and other health care
professionals is finite and cannot be expanded enough to cope with
the workload. The number of hospital beds with supporting
paraphernalia in the United States is also finite, and there will be
too few beds to cope with the workload. There are only about one
million hospital beds in the United States, and almost all of these
are already occupied.

Medical professionals realize they cannot stop this pandemic. Their
best advice is to wear a mask and wash your hands frequently. Even
the palliative medicines, such as TamiFlu are inadequate to the task.


This means that a major emphasis has to be made on stopping the
transmission of the virus and reducing the rates of infection at
least to a manageable level and perhaps stopping the spread of the
virus entirely. The experience with the Spanish Influenza Pandemic of
1918 suggests that quarantine or isolation works well in stopping the
spread of the disease.

Present plans call for states to call for voluntary quarantines. I
suspect that in the real event, the states will impose mandatory
quarantines. When quarantine is imposed, the major problems are how
to sustain the people after stocks of food are exhausted, how to
distribute medicines, and how to perform vaccinations. Doing these
things will be a major challenge for emergency managers and medical
people.

The law enforcement community with the help of the National Guard and
State Defense Forces will have to enforce the quarantines and
maintain law and order. Foolish people will refuse to obey the rules
of the quarantine and wander about carelessly spreading the virus.
Desperate people will use force to obtain scarce vaccines and
medicines. Hungry people will take it upon themselves to obtain food
for themselves and their families. Angry people will take out their
anger on medical and other people trying to help them. Criminals and
street gangs will take advantage of the situation to enrich
themselves.

During such a pandemic each governor will need a large number of
organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops to help law
enforcement agencies enforce the quarantines and provide security for
those who the spread of the disease and see that supplies of scarce
commodities are distributed fairly to all.   A strong SDF will be
needed.

The New Madrid Earthquake
This is a very real possibility.   If a magnitude 8.0 earthquake
occurs along the central portion of the Mississippi River Valley, the
consequences would be wide-ranging and serious. This has been a
concern of emergency managers for years, and FEMA is now engaged in
preparing a plan to deal with it.

The consequences will be severe.   All the bridges across the
Mississippi River from Cairo to St Louis will be down.   Roads and
bridges in seven states will be damaged.   Pipelines and electrical
cables will be down. Transportation will be at a standstill. Millions
of people will be left without essential services. Thousands will be
injured by collapsing structures, and many more will be left
temporarily homeless. The damage and disruption will be great.

A good concept for managing this catastrophic emergency is to ask all
residents to remain in their localities instead of trying to move
outside of the affected area. Search and rescue operations will be
conducted on a local basis, and localities will have to deal with
casualties from the effects of the earthquake. Essential supplies and
services and additional responders would be brought into the affected
states from outside private sector and federal resources and private
sector resources under Federal management. This will preclude having
thousands of persons on the highways trying to leave and making it
difficult for outside help to get to the survivors inside the
affected states.

In this kind of situation, there will be numerous instances of
violence. The local police will be overwhelmed, and the governors of
the affected states will have to provide National Guard and SDF
forces to assist in the immediate response tasks and in the
subsequent delivery and distribution of essential goods and services.
While Federal forces will be used, much of their effort will be on
the logistics of providing support. Responsibility for maintaining
law and order and securing the responders will fall on the governors.
They will need to have strong SDF units with organized, disciplined,
trained, and armed troops to augment the police and National Guard
forces.

A Prolonged Power Outage
It would be relatively easy for a terrorist group to cause a
widespread power outage either by physical means or by a cyber attack.
If this occurs, there would be widespread disruption of essential
services and distribution of essential goods. We all depend on
electrical power for what we do. We cannot pump gas without power. We
cannot work in offices, keep cool, or keep warm without power. We
cannot communicate or do business without power.  

It such an outage lasts for a few hours, it is a nuisance.    If the
outage lasts a few days, it is an irritant. If the outage lasts for a
few weeks, it is an emergency. If the outage extends over a large
region, those in the interior will not have recourse to support from
areas with power. A few families and a few businesses will have
backup generators. People living in houses with solar panels can get
by.   But the rest of us will have to do without.

Imagine if you will what your neighborhood would be like if the power
were out for six weeks.   Cars will run out of gas. Food would spoil.
Neighbors could turn mean. Street gangs could rove the streets doing
bad things. After food, water, and medicine, your most important need
would be for security, which can be provided only by the police or
troops.

The concept of the response operation for this catastrophic emergency
is to provide essential survival goods—food, water, and medicine—to
those without power. The policy will be to ask people to stay in
their homes and wait for help to come to them.   Large numbers of
people will try to self-evacuate to areas with power, thus impeding
the influx of supplies and workers and equipment to restore the power
supply.   So a major challenge for the authorities will be to enforce
the stay in place policy, assure fair distribution of essential
supplies, and maintain law and order. The police will be overwhelmed.
Governors will have to deploy their National Guard and State Defense
Forces to augment the police within their respective states.  

A Prolonged Disruption of Electronic Communications
The final catastrophic emergency I will address is a prolonged
disruption of electronic communications. This would be similar to the
prolonged power outage but greater in scope and even more disastrous
in its consequences.   It is possible to survive for a time without
power using the old fashioned way. Few of you can even envision what
it would be like to live without the internet and cell phones for a
long time.

We are very vulnerable to the failure of electronic devices. We have
abandoned the old methods that were used before electronic devices
appeared. Most of us have lost the skills necessary to function in a
non-electronic world.

As a society we have become very dependent, perhaps overly dependent
on the internet and electronic systems to manage data and to
communicate. When those systems fail massively it would be a
catastrophic emergency.
It is no secret that our systems are subjected to millions of cyber
attacks daily. Most of these are thwarted before they can do great
harm, but some do cause damage and money.

If our economy and society are suddenly deprived of electronic
communications, the disruption of will provoke disorder and provide a
fertile field for criminals and some normally law abiding citizens
driven to rage by frustration.   This condition on a regional or
national basis will soon become too hard for the police, and troops
will be needed to help maintain order and provide security while we
reestablish systems and learn to cope with a world without the
internet, cell phones, and electronic systems of all kinds. This is
yet another situation for which the existing of a strong SDF with
organized, disciplined, trained and armed troops would be very useful.


There are other catastrophic and lesser emergencies in which the SDF
can play an important role. But in order to have an adequate SDF,
some things have to be done.

What Needs to Be Done
There certainly is a persuasive case for having a large number of SDF
troops available to the Governors to deal with catastrophic
emergencies as well as lesser emergencies. It is up to all of us to
see that this case is made the basis for persuading the governors to
sponsor and fund such a program.
I will address three of the controversial issues that plague the SDF
community. They are whether the SDF is to be armed or not; whether
the SDF is to be a cadre or at full strength; and the overall
strength of the SDF.

Arming the State Defense Forces
To Arm or not to Arm? That is the question that gets to the bottom of
what the SDF is to be. Some TAGs want the SDF to be nothing more than
a source of low-cost help to perform administrative work and provide
support services. They perceive the proper role of the SDF is to do
some low priority programs for the Guard such as taking care of the
armories—sort of a supplementary caretaker group. That is not my
image. An unarmed SDF cannot perform the security and response
missions for which the SDF is needed and which is the sole basis for
having the SDF in the first place.   An unarmed militia is an
oxymoron.   

Except for the Naval Militia, which truly has the right idea on this
issue, none of the numerous competing volunteer organizations
envision arming their members.   They resemble what we old soldiers
would characterize as camp followers whose duties were to wash the
clothes and cook the food for those in the ranks. Indeed, it may be a
good idea to provide unarmed civilians to provide some of the support
for the National Guard that DOD has failed to provide, but that is
not the proper role of the State Defense Forces.  

The Nation has many law enforcement officers to enforce the law and
maintain order. There are about a million sworn police officers in
the United States. This number has remained stable for a decade
despite increasing population and crime. There are also almost a
million criminals and members of violent street gangs in the United
States. The balance between the cops and the criminals is precarious
even in normal times. When a catastrophic emergency occurs, the
police will need help. That help can be provided only by military
forces trained and armed to perform security duty.   These military
forces can come from Federal active duty and reserve units, from the
National Guards of the several states, and from the State Defense
forces—provided the SDF troops are trained and equipped with weapons
appropriate for their role.

Numerous other volunteer organizations exist to provide specialized
services for emergency response. The Red Cross is one. The Disaster
Response Medical System is another. The Neighborhood Watch is still
another.   The Civil Air Patrol and the Coast Guard Auxiliary perform
valuable services and can do so without being armed. The Citizen
Corps sponsored by DHS offers willing Americans an opportunity to
participate in Homeland Security programs by performing a variety of
jobs—none of which require them to be armed. If an individual objects
to serving in an armed force, he or she should join one of these
civilian organizations.

Often, when I mention the need for armed SDF, someone says that you
SDF members are not to be trusted with weapons. One retired regular
major general said he doubted whether you SDF members would be
capable or qualifying with your weapons on a range. Another senior
person said that arming you would be a threat to the nation. Many
members of the National Guard and some Adjutants General with SDF
units oppose arming your troops.

Those who oppose arming the SDF also offer some practical objections.
There is the additional burden of storing arms and ammunition,
conducting weapons training, and assuring that weapons safety is
maintained. Some fear consequences of accidents and the liability
issues that could result from them. Some fear that armed militia men
will go on a rampage in the woods and kill or wound civilians. These
arguments appear to be excuses to avoid arming the SDF. These same
objections apply to the National Guard itself. None of the objections
are sufficient reason either to disarm the National Guard or deny
weapons to the SDF.

All of these are excuses to avoid arming the SDF, but they are not
good enough to offset the need for organized, disciplined, trained,
and armed troops when they are Such arguments reflect badly on you.  
You have among your ranks veterans of active and reserve duty with
many years of military service and experience. How do you feel about
being labeled as either too incompetent or too untrustworthy or both
to command and train your soldiers to bear arms in defense of the
Nation?

The US is awash with handguns, rifles, and even some heavy weapons in
the hands of gangs, illegal militias, and other unauthorized criminal
groups. The bad guys will have arms, and experience indicates they
will use them for their own advantage. Sworn law enforcement officers
are responsible for maintaining law and order, but there will be too
few of them to maintain law and order during and after a catastrophic
emergency. National Guard troops will have arms, but they also will
be too few to do it all during and after a catastrophic emergency.
Federal troops will be armed, but they will arrive at the scene after
a delay. The need is for more organized, disciplined, trained, and
armed troops—and that is the role of the SDF.

I said before and I say again that sending unarmed SDF troops out to
enforce cordons, secure critical assets, manage evacuations, provide
security for firefighters and medical teams, and suppress civil
disorders would amount to criminal negligence.

Finally, I ask that you ponder this proposition. It is far better to
have arms and not need them than to need arms and not have them.
Cadres or Full Strength?

I note with sadness and disbelief that some states have adopted a
policy of maintaining their SDF units at cadre strength with the
expectation that they will be able to recruit, train, and bring their
units to full strength in time to do some good.   This will not work.


I can just picture it now. And I want you to think about it also. A
nuclear weapon has just detonated in Washington DC. The chief of
staff of the Virginia National Guard rushes into the AG’s office and
says breathlessly: General, Washington DC has just been attacked with
a nuclear weapon. What do we do now? The AG then says, “Send out the
recruiters to bring the Virginia Defense Force to full strength!” I
think not.

It is the nature of catastrophic emergencies to be unforgiving of
delayed responses. The attacks will occur without warning or with
little warning. There may be warning of some disasters but too little
advance notice to spend six to ten weeks bringing the State Defense
Force to full strength.

The only pseudo-advantage of cadre units is to provide the illusion
of readiness without the reality.   

For catastrophic emergencies in particular and for lesser emergencies
as well, it is absolutely necessary to be fully prepared in advance. 
That means that the SDF units must be at full strength, fully
equipped, have access to stockpiled supplies, and trained and
rehearsed on pre-scripted responses to catastrophic emergencies.   

Strength of the SDF
Finally, there ought to be some strength goals to pursue. The present
situation of 25 units sharing 20,000 active members is unsatisfactory.
That amounts to an average of 800 active members per state.   This is
far too few members to provide adequate support for a response to a
catastrophic emergency.  
My own initial strength goal would be to have 300,000 armed active
members of the SDF nationwide. This is an average of only about 6,000
per state. Surely that is a feasible goal.

The current small strength of the SDF is due to more to self-
inflicted budgetary wounds and worries about administrative burden
rather than difficulties of recruiting and retention. Recruiting will
succeed if it is tried. Retention will succeed if the troops are
given realistic training and important missions.  

There are large numbers of trained veterans of the campaigns in Iraq
and Afghanistan that have left active duty, do not want to join the
National Guard or a Federal Reserve Component, but would like to help
provide for the security of the United States in some way. These
prior-service personnel could be integrated into SDF units, undergo
some refresher training, and be ready to serve.   Many of these
people will be NCOs and junior officers, but the tables of
organization can be modified to have a grade structure that could
accommodate them.

The rationale for the initial goal of 300,000 active members is that
this is about half of the strength of the Army and Air National
Guards. The future employment of the National Guard on Federal active
duty to support the conduct of the war on terror is not known, but
the policy has been that each governor will have at least half of his
or her National Guard available for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support missions. We don’t know the future, but it is prudent to
assume that the National Guard will continue to contribute large
numbers of units and individuals to the Army and Air Force
respectively.

A strength of 300,000 active members will solve a lot of problems.
The SDF will become a recognized and reputable contributor to
Homeland Security instead of a little known, ineffective fringe group.
The stigma attached by some to a force considered by some to consist
mostly of self-styled generals and colonels will vanish. As the
strength of the SDF increases, the value of this military force in
lesser emergencies will be even more apparent. The National Guard may
even recognize the value of their SDF units and accept the SDF
soldiers as comrades.

In particular, the increased strength at low cost will be welcomed by
Governors when they face emergencies beyond their capacity to manage.
If Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi had large SDFs, the late
arrival of Federal troops for the Katrina Emergency would not have
been so damaging to the response. As it was, the use of 5,000 SDF
personnel mostly from other states was very useful in the Katrina
response operation.    

A strong SDF would or should be welcomed by DOD. The increased
capability of Governors to deal with attacks and disasters would
allow the states to deal with more emergencies without needing
federal help. When, as will be the case for catastrophic emergencies,
Federal resources and troops will be needed immediately, the presence
of strong SDF units in the incident area will fill the needs until
the Federal troops arrive.

Another factor is that the ability and perhaps the intention of DOD
to have the President federalize all of the National Guard elements
in an affected state will strip the governors of any resources needed
to support his or her own operations. In that event, the SDF will be
the only military forces available to the Governors. If that occurs,
a governor is certain to wish that he or she had done the right thing
for the SDF before the emergency occurred. It is up to us to relieve
governors from that prospect.

What Does the Future Hold for the SDF?
The SDF program is at a critical juncture. The State Guard
Association has to take some action. You have to decide whether you
are in business to advocate and lobby for a strong, armed militia or
to continue to maintain an unsatisfactory status quo. Taking action
for a strong SDF will not be an easy task. You have few allies. You
need to develop champions for a strong SDF. There are individuals out
there, some with great stature, that realize the importance of a
strong SDF and will work with you to make that happen. You need to
provide leadership and a focal point for all of individuals. In
particular, you have the ability to influence the governors and the
adjutants general who can make their SDFs valuable assets if they
want to.  

The title of this talk is The Role of the State Defense Forces in
Homeland Security.   In my view, that role is to provide large
numbers of organized, disciplined, trained, and armed troops to
augment the police, National Guard troops, and federal troops in
anticipation of and in response to catastrophic emergencies. It is up
to you members of the State Guard Association to assure that the
State Defense Forces are adequate to perform this role.

-end-

U.S. Freedom Foundation
1629 K Street NW Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: (202) 609-8938
Fax: (202) 609-8940